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,* decision in this case,
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i

("decision," attached as addendum A), aff - • •»• • \c u ial court's suppression of the
evidence and dismissal of charges of possession of marijuana, a third degree felony,
driving on a suspended license, a Ciu <
- *, w.^emeanor, and speeding,, a class C •
inisiku t J
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i, hrili, i the trial

'""iifl cf\rro«:tlv ruled that

Trooper Metz improperly detained defendants beyond the traffic purpose for the stop.
On appeal, this Court reviewed the trial court's ruling gran1
to suppress and staicu me i , ^

-wiendani *> motion

IL:

In this case, the tna. .
r ecifically found the "only facts . . ,
actually obsen able bv . . [law hooper] at the time he made his decision are
the smell of air freshener and the fact that neither occupant was the
registered owner of the car." The State does not dispute these factual

findings, and therefore, we accept them as true.
Bracero, slip op. at 2.
The above paragraph, while technically accurate, is misleading because it ignores
the trial court's additional undisputed factual findings regarding the trooper's knowledge,
the most critical of which is that defendant Ruiz had a history of drug smuggling (R. 151),
add. B.1 See also Aple. Br. at 5 ("[Trooper] Metz received the criminal history of both
defendants. Mr. Ruiz has a prior drug conviction in California, and Mr. Bracero has
assault and larceny charge on his record.").
The Court's confusion may have been caused by the fact that there are three
different rulings by the trial court concerning defendant's motion to suppress.2 This
Court quotes from the trial court's initial Ruling (R. 75-71), add. B. But the initial Ruling
was followed five months later with more specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

1

The Fourth Amendment does not require that the reasonable suspicion matrix be
based solely upon observable facts. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)
("An observed violation, however, is not required. Stopping a vehicle may also be
justified when the officer has 'reasonable articulable suspicion . ..'"). See also State v.
Shephard, 955 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah App. 1998) ("The reasonable suspicion must be
'based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing
the officer at the time...'"). Here, the smell of air freshener and the fact that neither
defendant was the registered owner of the car were arguably the only "observable" facts,
but they were not the only "articulable" facts. Indeed, as noted above, the trooper
testified and the and the trial court found that Ruiz had a history of drug smuggling (R.
151), add. B.
2

The pertinent rulings are contained in Addendum B.
2

Law (R. 152-150), add. B.3 This latter document represents the trial court's last word
concerning this case and includes specific findings that:
•

Trooper Metz both observed air freshener in defendant's vehicle and also
detected a strong odor of air freshener emanating from therein (R. 152),
add. B.

•

Both defendants had criminal histories and codefendant Ruiz had been
previously arrested for drug smuggling (R. 151), add. B.

•

Neither defendant was lawfully entitled to drive the vehicle (R. 151), add.
B.

•

Both defendants were nervous and neither defendant would make eye
contact with the trooper (R. 151), add. B.

Additionally, even in its initial Ruling to which this Court cites, the trial court
acknowledged that both defendants had criminal histories (R. 72), add. B.4 Finally, the
relevant record, attached as addenda A-H to the State's opening brief, amply supports
these findings.5 Thus, the Bracero decision fails to acknowledge all of the undisputed

3

The trial court also issued a cursory ruling denying the State's Objection to its
initial Ruling (R. 97).
4

The trial court explained that it discounted the defendants' criminal histories on
the ground that it did not establish that either defendant was "involved in criminal activity
at this time" (R. 72), add. B. However, the trial court's reasoning in this regard
contravene's State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah App. 1997), where this Court
held that criminal history properly contributes to the reasonable suspicion matrix. See
Aplt. Br. at 21 and Reply Br. of Aplt. at 7.
5

The trial court discounted the trooper's additional observations of maps, a cell
phone, and gapped molding (R. 151-150), add. B. For reasons stated in its opening brief,
the State disagrees with the trial court's rulings in this regard. Aplt. Br. at 19 n.6
However, as will be explained, the trooper's observation of these factors are not critical to
3

factual findings entered below.
Further, the failure to acknowledge all of the factual findings and undisputed facts
substantially adversely affected the result in this case. While it is true that the smell of air
freshener alone cannot provide a reasonable suspicion that drugs are present, Bracero,
slip op. at 2, the strong smell of air freshener together with defendant Ruiz's undisputed
history of drug smuggling is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. See Aplt. Br. at
17 (citing United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 57 F.3d 895, 898 (10th Cir. 1995)
(reasonable suspicion established based on use of masking agent and computer hit
indicating that defendant had previously been referred to Customs for zero tolerance
drugs); United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989) (reasonable suspicion
established based on use of recognized masking agent and DEA computer indication that
defendant was involved in drug trafficking)). See also Reply Br. of Aplt. at 5-6 (citing
United States v. Ledesma-Dominguez, 53 F.3d 1159, 1161 (10th Cir. 1995) (absence of
personal identification, together with defendant's nervous behavior and presence of
masking odor established reasonable suspicion); United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275,
1280 (7th Cir. 1996) (defendant's suspicious behavior and criminal history including two
prior drug convictions constituted reasonable suspicion for detention); United States v.
Pollington, 98 F.3d 341 (8th Cir. 1996) (odor of masking agent, together with defendant's

the issue here and the State therefore places no reliance upon them in arguing that
reasonable suspicion was otherwise established.
4

suspicious story and visibly nervous conduct sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion);
People v. Easley, 680 N.E.2d 776, 780 (111. App. 1997) (marijuana leaf decoration in
defendant's wallet, together with defendant's visible nervousness, suspicious behavior,
and prior drug conviction established reasonable suspicion), cert denied,

U.S.

,

119 S.Ct. 1144 (1999); State v. Armstrong, 659 N.E.2d 844, 847 (Ohio App. 1995) (high
crime area and suspicious nature of defendant's activity in huddling with a group with
hands moving within the tight group, together with defendant's history of drug offenses,
created reasonable suspicion)). The additional undisputed facts that neither defendant
could lawfully drive the vehicle, neither defendant would make eye contact with the
trooper, and that the stop occurred on a known drug-route (1-15), see State v. Poole, 871
P.2d 531, 534 n.l (Utah 1994), heighten an already reasonable suspicion of drug
trafficking. See Aplt. Br. at 16-18 and Reply Br. of Aplt. at 6-9. Thus, applying the
above law to the entirety of the factual findings entered here, e.g., the strong odor of air
freshener, Ruiz's history of drug smuggling, both defendants' refusal to make eye
contact, and the known drug route location of the stop, reasonable suspicion is clearly
established. This Court should grant the petition for rehearing to fully consider all of the
undisputed factual findings entered below.
Secondarily, the Court's reasonable suspicion analysis does not dispose of this
case. See Bracero, slip op. at 3 ("We do not address the State's remaining arguments
because of our holding concerning lack of reasonable articulable suspicion."). Indeed,
5

Lopez, makes plain that only "investigative questioning that further detains the driver
must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity." 873 P.2d at
1132 (emphasis added).
As set forth in the State's opening and reply briefs, the trooper's request to search
did not further detain defendants within the meaning of Lopez. This is so because, as
found by the trial court, neither defendant could lawfully drive (R. 73), add. B; (R. 151),
add. B. See also Aplt. Br. at 12-15; Reply Br. of Aplt. at 1-4. Defendants have not, and
cannot challenge this finding as clearly erroneous. See Aple. Br. at 12 (acknowledging
that "the State could have detained and arrested the Defendants for traffic violations[.]").
Cf State v. Moosman, 19 A P.2d 474, 475 (Utah 1990) ("When challenging the findings of
fact of the trial court on appeal, the [challenging party] must show that the findings of fact
were clearly erroneous.").
Precisely because neither defendant could lawfully drive, any detention
engendered by the trooper's request to search was justified as incident to the ongoing
traffic purpose of the stop. Reply Br. of Aplt. at 1. Whether the trooper also reasonably
suspected defendants were smuggling drugs is immaterial. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, this Court should withdraw its decision affirming the
suppression ruling below and issue a revised decision that conforms to all of the trial
court's undisputed factual findings and to controlling authority. The revised opinion
6

should therefore reverse the lower court on the ground that further detention, if any, was
justified.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on b December 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

IAN DECKER
/Assistant Attorney General
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Samuel Bracero and Arturo
Ruiz,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
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FILED
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1999 UT App 351

Defendants and Appellees

Fourth District, Nephi Department
The Honorable Anthony W. Schofield
Attorneys:

Jan Graham and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
Jere Reneer, Spanish Fork, for Appellee Bracero
Alan Dayton, Salt Lake City, for Appellee Ruiz

Before Judges Wilkins, Billings, and Davis.
WILKINS, Presiding Judge:
The State appeals the trial court's order of dismissal based
on defendants Samuel Bracero and Arturo Ruiz's successful motion
to suppress for lack of reasonable suspicion. The trial court
upheld the validity of the initial stop, but concluded that the
subsequent detention of defendants exceeded the scope of the stop
and was therefore illegal. We affirm.
In reviewing a challenge to a trial court's suppression
ruling, we will not reverse the factual findings underlying that
ruling unless they are clearly erroneous. See State v. James,
858 P.2d 1012, 1014 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). However, "whether a
specific set of facts giv.es rise to reasonable suspicion is a
determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for
correctness . . . [with] a measure of discretion [given] to the
trial judge when applying that standard to a given set of facts."
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).
In determining whether a search is constitutionally
reasonable, we examine whether: (1) the trooper's action was
justified at its inception; and (2) whether the resulting

detention was reasonably related to the circumstances justifying
the initial stop. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32
(Utah 1994). Once the investigation based on the initial stop of
the vehicle has been completed, the occupants must be allowed to
proceed on their way. See State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). "Any further temporary detention for
investigative questioning after the fulfillment for the purpose
of the initial traffic stop is [un]justified . . . [unless] the
detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal
activity." Id. Defendants concede the trooper was justified in
making the initial stop because he observed defendants' car
speeding. Therefore, we focus on whether the officer had a
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity justifying
further detention of the defendants.
In this case, the trial court specifically found the "only
facts . . . actually observable by . . . [the trooper] at the
time he made his decision to [further] detain the vehicle and
which support the decision are the smell of air freshener and the
fact that neither occupant was the registered owner of the car."
The State does not dispute these factual findings, and therefore,
we accept them as true. See C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics,
Inc. , 896 P.2d 47, 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ('"Because appellants
do not challenge the trial courtfs factual findings, we must
accept this finding as true.").
Although the smell of air freshener alone cannot provide a
reasonable suspicion that drugs are present, see United States v.
Alvarez, 68 F.3d 1242, 1245 (10th Cir. 1995) (McKay, J.,
concurring) ("Standing alone, air freshener is not sufficient to
justify a reasonable search for drugs."), air freshener coupled
with other suspicious circumstances may support further
reasonable inquiry. See id. However, the additional
circumstance in this case, namely, the fact that neither occupant
was the registered owner of the car, is not a sufficient
indication of criminal activity. This fact is just as consistent
with the innocent explanation that the driver borrowed the car
from its rightful owner. See State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 764
(Utah 1991) (stating "while the lack of a registration
certificate and the fact that the occupants did not own the car
raised the possibility that the car might be stolen, this
information, without more, does not rise to the level of an
articulable suspicion that the car was stolen"). Absent more,
there was no articulable Suspicion that the car had been stolen
or that defendants were transporting drugs. Because the smell of
air freshener coupled with the fact that neither defendant was
the registered owner of the car was insufficient to justify
extension of the stop, such detention was unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's suppression ruling. We

981529-CA

2

do not address the Statefs remaining arguments because of our
holding concerning lack of reasonable articulable suspicion.
Affirmed.

~KJIJJ.UA
Michael J. Wilkins,
Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

Judith_M._Billinas, Judge

r

James \Z. Davi

981529-CA
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FILED 3 - I f f

Fourth Judicial District Court of
Juab County. State of Utah
CARMA B. JSMITH.CIerk
. Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER: 971400222/
97140223

vs.

SAMUEL BRACERO,
DATED: MARCH 3, 1998
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH,

RULING

Plaintiff,
vs.

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

ARTURO RUIZ,
Defendant.
This case is before the court on defendants' motions to suppress evidence
obtained incident to a traffic stop. Evidence on these motions was received on
January 12, 1998. Thereafter the parties submitted their argument on the evidence in
writing by post hearing briefs. Having reviewed that evidence and their briefs, I now
issue this ruling granting the motions to suppress.
In this case there are three issues to be decided:
a)

was the traffic stop proper,
1

b)

was the detention of Bracero and Ruiz proper, and

c)

was the officer justified in searching the defendants1 vehicle?
ANALYSIS

a)

Was the traffic stop propei?
It is well established that a peace officer is justified in stopping a vehicle when

the stop is incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence. See.
&&, State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). In the present case, the defendants1
automobile was observed traveling 83 m.p.h. in a 75 m.p.h. zone. The traffic stop for
speeding was appropriate.1
b)

Was the detention of Bracero and Ruiz propei?
Turning now to the defendants' detention subsequent to the traffic stop. It is

proper when an officer conducts a traffic stop for an officer to request a driver's
license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. See,
e.g.. State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), In this case Trooper
Metz approached the window of the vehicle and requested a driver's license and the
vehicle registration. Thereafter he returned to his patrol vehicle and conduced a

1

Defendants argue in their motion to suppress that the traffic stop was somehow racially
motivated because the defendants are Hispanic. The facts surrounding the stop do not support this
conclusion. The defendants' car was "painted" with the radar gun long before the officer could have
observed that the two individuals in the car were Hispanic. When the defendants* car passed the
patrol vehicle at speeds above 75 m.p.h., the driver was wearing military style sun glasses and would
not have been easily identifiable as being Hispanic. In this case the patrol car was at mile marker 217
on 1-15 and the stop took place at or near mile marker 219, a distance of roughly two miles. This is
not enough distance to support the suggestion that the peace officer pulled out, did a "UM turn,
accelerated to pursuit speed and tailed the defendants' car for several minutes while observing that the
occupants of the car were Hispanic before pulling them over. I discount the claim that the stop was
racially motivated or that the defendants had been stopped because the fit some sort of profile.

2

computer check from which he learned that Bracero's driver's license was suspended.
Neither occupant of the vehicle was properly licensed to drive the vehicle. Thereafter,
Metz claims to have observed facts which raised his suspicion as to whether
defendants had possession of contraband. At that point he switched from a traffic stop
to a drug investigation.
Trooper Metz asserts that the following objective facts supported his decision
to seek permission to conduct the search:
a)

he smelled a strong odor of air freshener,

b)

neither occupant of the vehicle was its registered owner,

c)

the plastic panels in the rear of the vehicle had gaps and did not fit properly,

d)

there was a map and a cellular telephone in the vehicle,

e)

the vehicle was from out of state and was headed to Idaho,

f)

both occupants appeared nervous and Ruiz would not make eye contact with

the officer, and
g)

both occupants had prior criminal histories and the passenger had previously

been convicted of drug trafficking.
I am convinced that not all of these facts were available to Trooper Metz when
he made the decision to search the vehicle. First, he could not have seen the map and
the cell phone when he looked in the car as they were lying in the console between
the seats and not easily observable from his view outside the vehicle. Second, when
asked on cross, Trooper Metz could not explain which panels were gapped and did not
seem properly attached. Third, that the vehicle was from out of state and headed to

3

Idaho does not evidence criminal activity. The vehicle was on an interstate highway
which many, many vehicles use to travel from one state to the another, only traveling
through but not staying in Utah. Fourth, the past criminal histories of the two
defendants does not establish that either was involved in criminal activity at this time.
Fifth, nervousness standing alone is not grounds for a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. For differing reasons some of us react with much more nervousness than
others when in the presence of police officers; and many of those reasons have nothing
to do with ongoing criminal activity.
The only facts which I find actually observable by Trooper Metz at the time he
made his decision to detain the vehicle and which support that decision are the smell
of air freshener and the fact that neither occupant was the registered owner of the car.
These are too slim a reed upon which to base the decision to detain the vehicle. That
Bracero thereafter consented to the search does not rescue the search as there has been
no showing that the detention prior to the search was proper.2 I am well aware that in
evaluating the appropriateness of an investigative stop or detention, I must look at the
totality of the circumstances observable to the officer. See United States v. Sokolow.
490 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). While I give credit to the officer because he is out on the
front lines in a serious effort to enforce the laws of the State of Utah3, given all of the

2

Trooper Metz claims that Bracero consented to his search of the vehicle while defendants claim
that Bracero did not give consent. I need not reach this issue as I conclude that the detention prior to
the request for consent to search was improper.
3

Defendants became quite personal in their closing arguments, attacking both Trooper Metz and
his supervisor, Sergeant Paul Mangelson. Though I rule in defendants' favor, I do not adopt that
portion of their brief which impugns the integrity of either officer.

4

evidence received at the hearing, I am not convinced that the officer had reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify his detention of the defendants past
the original traffic stop.
I grant the motions to suppress. Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, defendants' counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order.
Recognizing that defendants have been in custody for a significant time on
these charges and that Bracero still faces the charges of driving on suspension and
speeding, I direct that both defendants be released on their own recognizance and a
promise to appear and that the matters be set for further hearing at an appropriate time.

5
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Fv-.th Judicial District Court of
Juab County, State of Utah
CARMA B„ SMITH, Clerk
(7N\n
Deputy -

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintig

CASE NUMBER: 971400222/
97140223

vs.
SAMUEL BRACERO,
j DATED: MAY 22,1998
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH,

RULING

Plainth%

vs.

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

ARTURORUIZ,
Defendant.
This case is before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, on the State's motion to reconsider.
On March 3,1998,1 issued a ruling granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence
obtained incident to a traffic stop. Thereafter, the Statefileda motion to reconsider on April 22,
1998, followed by defendant's memorandum in oppositionfiledon May 11,1998. Having
received and reviewed the memoranda, I deny the State's motion to reconsider.
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the State is directed to
prepare an appropriate order.

1

Dated this _Z?day of May, 1998.

BY THE COURT:

w

W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE
$

SiCJirN

:.ti

&»£
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FILED J-H-^g
Fourth Judicial District Court of
Juab County, State of Utah
CARMA B.
6 / SMITH, Clerk

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

?ffi

Deputy

CASE NUMBER:
971400222/971400223

Plaintifi;
vs.

DATED: AUGUST 14,1998

SAMUEL BRACERO
ARTURO RUIZ,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendants.
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

The above entitled matter having come before the above entitled Court on defendants'
Motion to Suppress. The State was represented by David 0. Leavitt, Juab County Attorney, and
the defendants were represented by Jere Reneer, attorney for the defendants. After hearing the
evidence and reviewing the memoranda filed by counsel. The Court makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On November 14, 1997, Trooper Hoby Metz of the Utah Highway Patrol, stopped a
1989 Ford Tempo for traveling 83 m..p.h. in a 75 m.p.h. zone.
2. The driver of the vehicle was Samuel Enrique Bracero. Arturo Ruiz was a passenger
in the vehicle.
3. Upon approaching the vehicle, Trooper Metz testified he detected a strong odor of air
fresheners and could see the air freshener on the console.
1

4. The defendants were traveling from California and going to Idaho.
5. Trooper Metz returned to his patrol car and conducted criminal history and driver's
license requests on the two occupants of the vehicle. Both occupants had prior criminal histories
and the passenger previously had been arrested for drug smuggling.
6. The driver had a suspended license. Neither occupant could legally operate the vehicle.
7. The driver and passenger appeared nervous and would not make eye contact with the
officer.
8. Because he suspected that driver and passenger were involved in drug trafficking, the
officer asked for consent to search the vehicle.
9. The defendants consented to the search.
10. A search of the vehicle revealed 17 packages of marijuana weighing approximately 31
pounds in the side rear panels of the vehicle behind the moldings the officer had observed.
11. At the time the officer asked for permission to search he had certain facts in his mind
which he felt justifed continued detention of the defendants. Regarding these facts, I find as
follows:
A. Trooper Metz could not have seen the map of cell phone when he looked in the
car since they were located between the seat and the console of the car. The map nor cell phone
would not by itself be evidence of criminal activity.
B. Trooper Metz explained that the molding in the rear part of the car appeared
altered. On cross examination, however, he could not explain which panels were gapped and did
.not seem properly attached. Thus his recollection of the event was too tenuous upon which to
base a continued detention. Dl-fitting molding would not by itself be evidence of criminal activity.

2

C. An out-of-state car headed to Idaho does not, by itself, evidence criminal
activity.
D. The nervousness of the defendants does not justify further detention nor, by
itself, is it evidence of criminal activity.
E. The airfreshenersmell does not justify further detention. The smell of air
freshener, by itself does not evidence criminal activity.
F.

The fact that neither occupant of the vehicle was the registered owner does

not warrant a detention beyond that of traffic stop nor by itself does it evidence criminal activity.
12. The Statefileda Motion to Reconsider based upon State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196
(Utah, 1995) and also State v. Alires, 960259 CA, (Ut. App. 3-3-98) which held that driving on
suspension is an arrestable offense.
13. The Court denied the Motion to Reconsider without comment.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
1. "The Courtfindsthat the Trooper Metz's initial stop of the vehicle was justified.
2. The officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify his
detention of the defendants past the original traffic stop.
3. The defendants consented to the search of the vehicle but that search was tainted by
the already existing illegal detention.
4. The Court therefore grants the motion to suppress.
Dated this J& day of August, 1998.
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